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ABSTRACT  
In this article, we provide a description of the good in health promotion. This description comes 
from an empirical study of health promotion practices in New South Wales, the most populous state in 
Australia. Through analysis of interviews and observations, we found that practitioners were unified by a 
vision of the good in health promotion that had substantive and procedural dimensions. Substantively, the 
good in health promotion was teleological: the good inhered in meliorism, an intention to promote health, 
which was understood holistically and situated in places and environments, a commitment to primary 
rather than secondary prevention, and engagement with communities more than individuals. 
Procedurally, the good in health promotion arose from qualities of practices: that they developed over 
time in respectful relationships, were flexible and responsive to communities, built capabilities in 
communities, and were sustainable. We discuss our findings with reference to Martha Nussbaum’s 
normative list of functional capabilities for a good human life, David Buchanan’s vision for health 
promotion ethics, and common concerns in health promotion ethics regarding the relationship between 
paternalism and freedom. Our thick, vague conception of the good in health promotion, founded in the 
values and practical reason of people engaged daily in health promotion work, makes an important 
contribution to the development of a more complete theory of health promotion ethics.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the public health ethics literature has expanded rapidly in the last decade, only a small 
proportion of this work has focused on the ethics of health promotion. It is reasonable to expect that a 
distinct ethics of health promotion might be useful and necessary, given that health promotion is often 
distinguished from, and seen as a subset of, public health practice. Public health, the broader category, 
includes a wide range of disease prevention, health protection and health promotion activities; within this, 
health promotion is defined as ‘the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve, 
their health,’ (First International Conference on Health Promotion 1986). One significant contribution to 
health promotion ethics has been the work of David Buchanan, whose writing develops a broad vision for 
health promotion based on a teleological  ethic (Buchanan 2000).
1
 Buchanan argues that health 
promotion practitioners require practical reason and that revitalisation of civic engagement is needed for 
health promotion to flourish. For Buchanan, the ultimate purpose of health promotion is the development 
of a broad, eudaimonic form of wellbeing in citizens.
2
 This wellbeing is a multidimensional virtue that can 
be achieved only within just social arrangements, focused on ‘living one’s life in accordance with values 
that matter’ (Buchanan 2000 p103). Although other contributions to health promotion ethics have been 
less explicitly teleological than Buchanan, the issue of defining health has been central, as reflected in the 
call for papers for this issue. There has also been considerable exploration of potential tensions between 
paternalism or coercion and freedom or liberty in health promotion (Bayer and Moreno 1986; Jones and 
Bayer 2007 ; Jennings et al. 2003; Nilstun 1994), ongoing debate between practitioners regarding values 
in health promotion, and some advocacy by practitioners for the importance and value of ethics (e.g. 
Sindall 2002; Tannahill 2008; Views on health promotion online 2008).  
As Buchanan’s analysis makes clear, health promotion is a practice. This is reinforced by iconic 
statements like the Ottawa Charter (First International Conference on Health Promotion 1986) and in the 
health promotion literature, which has a strong practice focus (e.g. Health Promotion Journal of Australia: 
Official Journal of Australian Association of Health Promotion Professionals  1990ff). This practice 
orientation in health promotion motivated the contribution we make in this article. Believing that any 
theorising about health promotion must remain rooted in practice, we approached health promotion ethics 
via a qualitative empirical study of the work of health promotion practitioners in New South Wales, the 
most populous state in Australia. We used qualitative methods because they allow us to develop detailed, 
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emic understandings of the perspectives of social actors, the meanings they share, and the social 
processes they are engaged in; this provides a sound basis for moral evaluation (Flyvbjerg 2001; Frith 
2012). We collected data about health promotion in general and especially about the prevention of 
overweight and obesity. We had two main goals: first to develop a detailed empirical account of health 
promotion practice, particularly the values and ethical commitments of health promotion practitioners; and 
second to use this knowledge to extend existing theories of health promotion ethics.  
Through our initial inductive analysis of the resulting empirical data, we concluded that health 
promotion practitioners were largely unified by a vision of the good in health promotion: we thus use this 
article to extend theorisation of the good in health promotion. We will situate this analysis in theories 
developed by Martha Nussbaum and David Buchanan. We seek to bring together the practical reason of 
health promotion workers – not often heard in the ethics literature – with concepts from ethical theory – 
which do not often appear in the health promotion literature – and thus to extend the theory of health 
promotion ethics.   
 
METHODS 
This study is part of a larger project which critically examined the nature and role of values, ethics 
and evidence in current health promotion interventions in New South Wales, Australia. We particularly 
focused on interventions in overweight and obesity because this issue dominates health promotion policy 
and funding in Australia at time of writing. The study methodology combined grounded theory (Charmaz 
2006) and ethnography (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). We selected three regions as research sites. 
These varied in levels of urbanisation, socioeconomic status and degree of research activity. The regions 
were defined using the borders of the corresponding health administration jurisdictions. The largest of 
these was approximately 60,000 km
2
 and each contained several health promotion teams spread across 
urban centres and regional towns.  
We conducted 58 semi-structured interviews with 54 participants. All practitioners who were 
implementing or overseeing overweight and obesity related health promotion activities were invited to 
participate; most agreed. The practitioner-participants came from diverse levels of experience and/or 
seniority (ranging from 6 months to over 30 years), roles including research & evaluation, media & 
communications, and project implementation, and responsibilities including junior project officers, senior 
management and unit directors. Per site, 20, 21 and 13 practitioners respectively participated; interviews 
lasted from 30 to 150 minutes. We kept the introductory interview questions as broad as possible; 
interviews gradually became more focused on the informant’s core values, moral intuitions and ethical 
reasoning. The interview questions were revised twice as the study progressed. The relevant questions 
from the final interview route are presented in Box 1. Both interviewers had training or experience in 
public health or health promotion. Interviewers focused on encouraging lengthy explanations and probing 
meaning. Interviews occurred in the participants’ workplaces, and during work hours so it is possible that 
participants may sometimes have felt constrained either by time or the location, although there was little 
evidence of this in the data. Interviews were transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriber. We also 
engaged in participant and non-participant observation and collected relevant organisational program and 
policy documents: these data complemented and contextualised the interviews. Data collection 
commenced in May 2010 and was completed in June 2011. 
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Box 1: Sections of the interview route relevant to this analysis 
Introductory questions: 
Can you please tell me the story of your career so far? 
What have been the best things in your career in health promotion?  
What have been the worst things in your career in health promotion?  
What has been the most rewarding project? What has made it rewarding? 
What has been the most frustrating project? What has made it frustrating? 
What values drive you personally in health promotion? [Probe if difficult: What really matters to you as 
a health promotion professional?] 
 
Values in overweight and obesity prevention: 
If you made the decisions, what kinds of programs would you develop and fund in overweight and 
obesity prevention? [Probe: What is it about those programs?]  
Are there programs that you wouldn’t fund? [Probe: What is it about those programs?] 
What effect has the increased focus on overweight and obesity had on your work? [Probe: What 
effect has it had on health promotion resources?] [Note: adjust question depending on participants’ 
seniority to ask instead about their team’s work or the work of health promotion in the Area Health 
Service] 
 
Ethics: 
Do you think there are right and wrong ways to do health promotion? [Probe: how did you come to 
that point of view?] 
Have there been times when colleagues have disagreed about what was the right or wrong thing to 
do?  [Probes: what was it about that issue? why did people feel so strongly about it?]   
 
Finishing questions: 
If you had the freedom to determine the role of a health promotion service, what should it do? [Probe: 
what is it about those ideas / directions that is important?] 
You’ve been in health promotion for x years. [For experienced people:] What’s kept you there? [For 
less experienced people:] Do you think you will stay? What guides your intentions? 
In an ideal world, what would the next 10 years of your career in health promotion look like? How 
would you like them to look? 
 
We commenced data analysis soon after interviewing began. Early inductive data analysis 
involved detailed coding, extensive memo writing and team discussion; later analysis became more 
focused, combining codes, exploring relationships and developing analytic categories (Charmaz, 2006a). 
We were not seeking to replicate any specific ethical theory, although we were sensitised to existing 
theories.  The central categories presented in our analysis were developed from the data rather than 
being imposed. When these categories  had been developed and related to one another, we observed an 
unexpected resonance between them and the list of basic human functional capabilities proposed by 
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Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1999). This led us, in our normative deliberations, to compare our findings 
not only with the existing health promotion ethics literature but also with Nussbaum’s analysis. 
Ethics approvals were obtained from the Sydney South West Area Health Service Human 
Research Ethics Committee under the Model for Single Ethical and Scientific Review of Multi-Centre 
Research; student involvement was ratified by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of 
Sydney. All participants gave individual consent to be interviewed or observed; unit managers consented 
to release documents. All participants were free to withdraw from the study or parts of it at any time. All 
data used has been de-identified by replacing names with alphanumeric codes.   
 
FINDINGS 
Participants shared a multi-dimensional definition of the good. While participants did not engage 
in an explicit discussion of ‘the good’ in health promotion, notions of the good ran through all of the 
evaluative accounts provided. 
This description of the good had two dimensions: a substantive dimension, which was 
teleological, and a procedural dimension which described qualities of practices. Substantively, health 
promotion practitioners valued actions that were melioristic, that sought to improve health, defined 
holistically and positively, that were intended to prevent disease from developing in healthy people rather 
than reducing risk in already at-risk or sick people, and that engaged more at a collective than an 
individual level. Procedurally, health promotion practitioners thought that the good in practice came from a 
particular kind of relationship-building, which was responsive, capability enhancing, developed over a 
long time, and oriented to sustainability. These dimensions of the good are summarised in Figure 1.  
FIGURE 1: Dimensions of the ‘good’ in Health Promotion Practice 
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SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSIONS OF THE GOOD IN HEALTH PROMOTION 
 
Meliorism as a teleological good 
Health promotion practitioners valued melioristic goals: that is, they thought it was good to be 
committed to making the world a better place through human effort. Practitioners were dedicated to 
‘making a difference,’ a phrase used frequently in interviews, and expressed a desire to initiate, drive and 
facilitate change ‘for the better.’ Participants understood themselves to be members of a group with 
common values, who were altruistically, and often at some personal cost, drawn to a career that offered 
the satisfaction of contributing to change.   
… there’s probably a sense of wanting to make a big difference and wanting to be part of 
something big […] most people come into [health promotion] with this understanding, the idea that we can 
really make a big difference to the population in a good way, in the long term. B8 841-869 
...people that work in health promotion want to change things for the better...  [to] change ... the 
health of the population that we work with and that’s why people work here.  It’s not for the money.  Most 
people that work in health promotion could probably get jobs elsewhere with ... a lot more money.  But 
people really believe in what they do... A15 653 
 
A holistic conceptualisation of health as a teleological good 
Most participants said that health promotion should aim to achieve health, defined holistically. 
Thus, a holistic conception of health was part of the good in health promotion. Health was conceptualised 
holistically in two senses. First: most participants emphasised that people were embedded in social 
environments and places, and needed to be understood in those contexts. Defining health in this way 
supported broad goals such as decreasing social and economic inequity, working on root causes of ill 
health in places or social contexts, or improving the social determinants of health, rather than narrow, 
biomedically defined goals:  
‘the holistic nature of health promotion in terms of the holistic view of health ... that health is not 
just about the absence of disease ...It’s so clichéd, I know, but the whole social determinants thing and 
the way that all that contributes to health ... [there is a]... shared vision that people in health promotion 
seem to have about that.’ C11 68 
Definitions of health were also holistic in a second sense: for many participants, health was not 
just physical, but to do with the whole person – particularly the emotions – which for some participants 
produced a responsibility to care:  
For me health promotion is helping and supporting people, to be able to look at the sorts of things 
that [are] within their control and power to do for themselves in terms of their health.  It's about 
maintaining wellbeing ... certainly not only physical wellbeing but mental and psychological wellbeing.  It 
involves, for me, as a practitioner ... trying to set up supports and strategies that can facilitate or enable 
the community to do that. B2 504 
 
Primary prevention as a teleological good 
A standard distinction in public health is between primary prevention, which aims to prevent the 
onset of disease, and secondary prevention, which occurs after disease has commenced but aims to 
minimize resulting morbidity or illness, generally through early detection and management. This 
distinction was important to participants, who  saw a commitment to prevention rather than cure, and 
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primary rather than secondary prevention, as goods in health promotion. While health promotion 
practitioners may sometimes be expected to undertake secondary prevention, most participants thought 
this should not be their role:  
[Health promotion is] more about the proactive and the preventing illness and injury and that sort 
of thing rather than fixing it up at the end. B16 867-9 
..[my] interest in health promotion developed because I thought primary was better than 
secondary. So let’s start even earlier. C11 12 
You don’t try and treat overweight people and get them to lose weight; you treat people before 
they get overweight. C1 1300-1304 
Participants were not opposed to secondary prevention. Rather, they did not see secondary 
prevention as part of what was good in health promotion. In fact, secondary prevention was sometimes 
characterised as a distraction from ‘real’ health promotion – as misdirection of the scarce resources 
available for primary prevention and loss of a fundamental good:  
I actually think [health promotion] is so worthwhile and can have a big impact and I would hate to 
see anything happen to make it any less valuable or important than it is now.  ...We keep talking about it 
but prevention... all the money goes into all the whoopee doopee machines, when people have got 
something, but prevention, if you prevented the problems as much as you can, in the first place, we 
wouldn’t need all that money going into the health dollar. B10 1802 
We have a very clear commitment to primary prevention, and any time we’ve been asked as a 
health promotion service to get engaged around secondary or treatment programs […] I don’t want to be 
distracted by that. It muddies the water. As soon as we start dabbling in treatment we’ve lost our focus of 
what we want to be, which is physical activity, healthy eating, broad environmental support. A1 1080-5 
There was some concern amongst the workforce that there was growing pressure for health 
promotion practitioners to engage in secondary prevention, particularly regarding overweight and obesity. 
Some participants worried that because overweight and obese people – by some definitions at least – 
already had a disease, being required to focus on overweight and obesity diverted health promotion 
resources from primary to secondary prevention.  Others were more comfortable with a health promotion 
focus on preventing overweight and obesity if the strategies addressed root causes such as available 
opportunities to eat well and to be physically active, not only individual knowledge and behaviours.   
 
Practitioners’ evaluations of the place of primary versus secondary prevention in health promotion 
were clearly moral evaluations. An emphasis on secondary prevention was contrary to the essence of 
health promotion; it both undermined the good in health promotion and risked negative consequences. It 
undermined the good through:   
1. A focus on biomedical goals (i.e. disease reduction) rather than health promotion goals (i.e. 
increasing health in the community);  
2. Being reactive or curative (when it should be proactive and preventive);  
3. Taking negative goals such as ‘reducing overweight and obesity’ instead of positive goals such as 
‘increase healthy weight’ or ‘increase healthy eating’;  
4. Excluding those without identified risk factors, when health promotion should  be for everyone;  
5. Ignoring social context and failing to confront root causes; and  
6. Being unresponsive to the self-identified needs of communities.  
 
An emphasis on secondary prevention in health promotion would also have morally problematic 
consequences:  
1. misdirection of the limited resources available for primary prevention; 
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2. negative community self-understanding because of negative goal or problem framing;  
3. missed opportunities for positive health improvement, especially in people who are deemed ‘low risk’;  
4. greater victim blaming; and 
5. specific harms of interventions – for example, a focus on overweight may encourage anorexia.  
The 2 or 300 people that are exposed to [secondary prevention programs] will benefit hugely, but 
it won’t do much for the rest of us. A3a 332-336 
...the narrower view that the health department would like to focus on, that’s driven by hospital 
costs.  What are people coming into hospital for and taking up beds that cost us $3,000 a day?  Oh 
they’ve fallen, they’re smoking, they’re obese and overweight [...] it seems to me that health promotion is 
being used in the last 10 years to more or less reduce hospital costs rather than necessarily focus on 
priorities for communities. C8 744-5 
Despite the majority of practitioners arguing that positive primary prevention was essential to the 
good in health promotion, many acknowledged that framing problems in disease prevention terms was 
more attractive to politicians and decision-makers and more likely to be funded. This sometimes resulted 
in a perceived strategic need to communicate in this language with partner agencies, powerful clinicians 
and funders.  
 
 The collective as a teleological good 
Participants generally believed that health promotion action should engage at a collective more 
than an individual level: that is, that it should engage with communities or populations. This community 
focus signified a distinctive way of conceptualising individuals: as embedded in social, geographic and 
institutional environments and relationships, consistent with the holistic definition of health discussed 
earlier. Communities contained identifiable people, located in identifiable local places and contexts. This 
was – at least in part – a matter of scale: communities were conceptualised at a scale which allowed 
practitioners to identify the beneficiaries of their work. Communities were generally seen as the best 
informants about their own needs and working with communities provided job satisfaction for 
practitioners, many of whom found grass-roots work and having a local impact especially enjoyable:   
I think [health promotion as a whole has] lost a little bit of those local connections, I actually would 
have to say that. But I haven’t. I feel that that’s the only way that you can work with communities, is 
actually connect at the local levels.  And so I've stubbornly fought and stayed involved in a lot of things... 
A16 70 
I enjoyed doing that sort of grass roots community work... they’ve been among the most ... 
satisfying sorts of work. C8 301 
 
PROCEDURAL DIMENSIONS OF THE GOOD IN HEALTH PROMOTION  
The good in health promotion did not inhere only in the substance and purpose of health 
promotion – its goals, objectives and working concepts. The good also inhered in the process or practice 
of health promotion: developing a particular kind of relationship, being responsive to communities and 
building their capabilities, taking time, and working sustainably, so that when the practitioner withdrew 
from a program, the community would still be able to experience its benefits. We note that these 
procedural goods had both instrumental and intrinsic value. They were instrumentally valued because by 
acting in this way, substantive goods would be more likely to be achieved (particularly, actions would be 
more effective in delivering improvement in health, defined holistically, at a community level). However 
these procedural goods also had intrinsic moral value.   
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 Developing respectful relationships over time as a procedural good 
A particular kind of relationship was a good in health promotion. Relationship-building was 
intrinsically valued as an expression of interest and care and instrumentally valued for creating relevant, 
useful, acceptable, feasible and interactive programs and making a difference in people’s lives.  These 
good relationships required being present in the community – described by one participant as 
‘professional loitering.’ This involved listening and learning from people, developing understanding, trust 
and credibility, being open-minded and learning from mistakes. There was sometimes tension over the 
resources that should be devoted to such generalised relationship-building – in particular, this sometimes 
conflicted with the goals of politicians, funders and agenda-setters in the bureaucratic hierarchy. However 
it was seen as critical by many practitioners, particularly when communities were especially vulnerable.  
...that’s actually being respectful, taking cue from learning, walking alongside, letting them lead, 
you leading a bit. That sort of relationship stuff that’s really important, where’s that written in a plan? ... 
who am I to decide what works for a community that I have really no understanding [of]? ... It’s about 
actually involving the community in the decision-making.  It’s not that difficult.  It’s difficult because it 
requires process.  It’s difficult because it requires investment, respectful dialogue, conversation, 
engagement around various means, and you can’t talk to everybody. …It’s about taking on board the right 
way to do things so you actually involve and inform the group ... that you're supposed to be working with. 
A16 389-391/1249-53 
So it’s only when you actually sit next to people in the community, and talk to them and hear what 
it’s like for them, do you really start to understand some of the issues around people’s view of 
themselves, and their health, and the world that they live in. A1 385-388 
The good of relationship-building was time consuming; practitioners got to know communities 
over years, and committed to long-term goals. Time was needed because of the complex systemic nature 
of health promotion. It took time to build trust and form partnerships, shift social norms, address social 
determinants of health or coordinate the agendas of multiple and diverse stakeholders. This long time 
commitment contributed to the conflicts over relationship-building already described. It could also make it 
difficult to produce evidence of the value of health promotion, because – in contrast with clinical work – 
health promotion goals could take many years to achieve:  
...I guess the other frustrating thing is really short term funded projects. So projects that go for 6 
weeks and you’re expected to make changes in peoples’ health behaviours. It’s just madness; it’s just a 
huge waste of money... you can’t just run in and do something and then run away again. C1 203-210 
...sometimes it takes five years to get a project sustainable; it can take up to 10 years. Whereas 
it’s always like, ‘Okay, you’ve got a year to do this.’  The timeframes are unrealistic... A7 508-10  
 
Tailoring intervention to particular communities and building the capabilities of those 
communities as a procedural good 
We have already noted that conceiving of persons as existing in social contexts and focusing on 
the collective were teleological goods. There was a parallel procedural good: being responsive to the 
specifics of communities, and focusing on developing capabilities in community members. This had 
instrumental value – it ensured effective communication – and intrinsic value, as a form of respect, 
truthfulness, care and reciprocity. This responsiveness and capability-building was predicated on the 
quality of relationships already discussed. It involved recognising the existing strengths of communities 
and individuals, increasing transferable skills, and enabling communities to solve self-defined problems 
and to develop and evolve in their own way by building on their own strengths.  It was good to make 
participation in health enhancing activities attractive and easy, and to understand that there were many 
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competing priorities in human lives. This flexibility also made health promotion work rewarding and 
interesting for practitioners. 
People participating in a process and managing it themselves; those things are critical. A3a 152-3 
So I think it’s very good for a health promotion worker ... to be flexible and change quickly towards 
the people’s needs... I don’t like personally the top-down [approaches], which many traditional health 
services follow, like, we understand better, we are the experts – bullshit, you are not.  The grass roots up 
is the better way of working, this is what Ottawa Charter says, this is what the Jakarta Charter says, we 
know that they say all that.  ... best practice means you have to be open, to listen to people, what’s the 
best way to work for them.  How ... could they improve their lives ... only they can tell you that … [only] 
they can improve their lifestyle, not us ... you sit back and give the credit to the people.  Because they do 
this, it’s about their lives; it’s about their health, about their stories. A18 247, 272-3, 437-8, 1012, 1042 
As a result of this flexible, capability-building way of working, health promotion could achieve a 
range of benefits for participating communities:  increased opportunities to live healthy lives, changed 
social norms, enhanced local environments and improved socio-economic conditions, increased 
resilience, independence, dignity and skills, heightened awareness of the underlying causes of ill-health 
or barriers to good health, and increased opportunities for communities to act to achieve their own 
wellbeing.  
 
Sustainability as a procedural good 
Finally – with the exception of people whose roles included clinical as well as health promotion 
responsibilities – most participants said working sustainably was an important good. When a practitioner 
eventually left a program, the community concerned should still experience the benefits of that program. 
This expressed the logical consequence of building capabilities and focusing on communities. After a 
certain period of time, a health promotion program should have developed community capabilities such 
that community members could take full ownership of the work and the practitioner’s role would become 
less central:    
… then we can have all these projects running that are hopefully more sustainable because they 
are run by local people for local people, with our guidance. So the investment isn’t that great, but the 
outcome is amazing... C6 242-4 
 ‘And I guess the other big difference is that we didn’t go into preschools doing it to preschools, 
we went into preschools and formed management teams, which was a staff member, a parent, and a 
health person. So the three of us together […] would decide on the strategies and how it was going to 
work, so there would be some sustainability. So when health pulled out there was still this project 
management team who’d keep the program on after a year. And we’ve just done some research on the 
sustainability of that; we’ve gone back after two and three years and […] most of the strategies are still 
happening.’ C1 399-409 
 
DISCUSSION  
We found that health promotion practitioners shared a multidimensional understanding of the 
good in health promotion practice. This included both substantive, teleological dimensions, reflected in 
how the goals and objectives of health promotion were defined, and procedural dimensions, related to the 
way that health promotion strategies were carried out. We begin by reflecting on our description of the 
good in health promotion.  
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First, a particular ‘holistic’ conception of health – that is, health as physical, social and emotional 
and embedded in environments – was central to practitioners’ definitions of the good. As discussed, in the 
health promotion ethics literature there has been a tendency to focus on improved health as the main 
good offered by health promotion, and thus to focus on defining health. These practitioners certainly 
valued holistically-conceptualised health as a central good in health promotion. But their definition of the 
good included several other substantive and procedural dimensions. This both demonstrates the potential 
usefulness of a teleological approach for practitioners and expands the scope of the good that inheres in 
health promotion beyond health alone.   
Second, the good inhered in communities, rather than individuals. This suggests the potential to 
extend recent work regarding the importance of concepts of community in public health ethics to our 
thinking about health promotion ethics (Hunter and Leveridge 2011). Third, practitioners strongly valued 
primary prevention over secondary prevention and gave a series of both categorical and consequentialist 
reasons for this value. This suggests a need for future investigation of the validity and the moral 
significance of the distinction between primary and secondary prevention in an ethic of health promotion. 
Fourth, practitioners were strongly committed to meliorism, and saw themselves as part of a progressive 
societal project. Some forms of meliorism can be readily criticised for naiveté regarding the possibility of 
progress, or for imposing the values of dominant cultural groups onto less dominant groups. However the 
melioristic commitments of these practitioners need to be understood in relation to their equally strong 
commitments to processes that were just and inclusive. These practitioners explicitly spoke against 
forcing change onto vulnerable citizens, and they valued community self-determination. Good health 
promotion was seen as relational, responsive and capability-building, thus allowing the practitioner to 
become less important in a program over time.  
These findings have particular resonance with Martha Nussbaum’s empirically derived, normative 
list of central human functional capabilities (Nussbaum 1990, 1999, 1993). Nussbaum’s work contributes 
to the capabilities approach in moral and political philosophy. This approach builds on a liberal 
foundation, and thus foregrounds the moral importance of freedom. However capabilities scholars value a 
particular kind of freedom – the freedom to achieve wellbeing – and understand this freedom in terms of 
capabilities. Capabilities are opportunities for people to be and to do what they themselves value 
(Robeyns 2005). In this approach, having access to such opportunities – that is, possessing capabilities – 
is the most important freedom.  These moral claims have been applied theoretically in various ways, 
particularly to argue in support of development and against oppression. 
One of Nussbaum’s major contributions to the capabilities approach has been a list of central 
human functional capabilities. These are the opportunities that she argues are necessary for a good 
human life. These are the opportunity for: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and 
thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, living with concern for other species, play and control over 
one’s environment (Nussbaum 1999). A key difference between Martha Nussbaum and her close 
colleague Amyarta Sen is that Sen pursues an even more radically underspecified notion of the good, 
resisting even listing the broad categories in which people should be able to pursue what they value (Sen 
and Nussbaum 1993).  
Nussbaum and Sen are both committed to liberalism and development, but Nussbaum argues 
that this is best pursued by agreement on a ‘human core’ of goods that all people should have access to. 
Her list, developed empirically, is not offered as a prescriptive ideal. Rather, it is a ‘thick vague notion of 
the good’ (Nussbaum 1990), that is, it is rich, comprehensive and empirically founded (‘thick’), but is open 
enough to allow it to be specified in particular local contexts (‘vague’). Nussbaum’s intention in producing 
the list is at least partly political: to create a locus for consensus between people from widely different 
cultures about what is needed to pursue a good human life,  and thus to assert a moral claim to at least a 
threshold of opportunity for all people (Nussbaum 1999). We see parallels between Nussbaum’s list and 
the list developed in our project.  
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First, our list was also empirically derived, and also leaves considerable room for local 
specification.
3
 Second, some key commitments of capabilities scholars parallel the commitments of the 
practitioners who participated in this study. Most obviously, practitioners talked about building the 
capabilities of community members, facilitating opportunities for them to enhance their health, very 
broadly defined. Practitioners were also melioristic, similar to the valuing of human development that has 
been important in the capabilities approach. Third, there are overlaps between the content of our list and 
Nussbaum’s list. The substantive goods of primary prevention and a holistic, situated conceptualisation of 
health resonate with Nussbaum’s listing of life, bodily health, bodily integrity and emotions as central 
capabilities. The procedural goods of respectful relationship-building and the support of skill development 
and independent health improvement resonate with Nussbaum’s inclusion of practical reason – being 
able to form a conception of the good and plan one’s own life based on critical reflection – and affiliation – 
being able to live in relationship and social contact with others – as central capabilities.  
This said, there are differences between the two lists, most obviously that Nussbaum’s is a list of 
the goods that make a human life worth living, while the list we have generated is of the good in health 
promotion. This difference can be usefully considered via the issue of moral obligation in the capabilities 
approach. Both Nussbaum and Sen assume that there is a moral obligation to ensure that people have 
access to capabilities. However these obligations are underspecified theoretically, including in relation to 
whose obligations they might be (Robeyns 2005; Sen and Nussbaum 1993). It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to attempt to theorise these obligations directly. We note, however, that Nussbaum intends her list 
of capabilities to offer ‘real guidance to policymakers, and far more accurate guidance than that offered by 
the focus on utility, or even on resources’ (Nussbaum 1999 p 14-15). This implies that policymakers ought 
to provide opportunities to develop these capabilities. Health promotion, particularly when publicly funded, 
is one means by which public policy could meet this underspecified obligation to support capabilities. The 
practitioners in this study, like all health promotion practitioners, were obliged to ‘promote health’ by virtue 
of their employment. The key issue this raises for theory and practice is: what does this obligation entail? 
We propose that the normative assessment developed here is a first attempt at a ‘thick, vague notion’ of 
both substantive and procedural good in health promotion. This, we argue, like Nussbaum’s list of 
capabilities, implies a set of obligations: obligations to be committed to or work towards certain 
substantive goods, and obligations to implement a particular form of procedural justice in doing so. Like 
Nussbaum’s list, it could function both as a normative agenda implying obligations to act and as a focus 
for further moral deliberation.  
How does our capability-oriented approach compare with David Buchanan’s ethic for health 
promotion (Buchanan 2000)? Buchanan, like Nussbaum, draws extensively on Aristotle,
4
 and his vision is 
founded on two Aristotelian concepts. The first is phronesis or practical reason: this is what health 
promotion practitioners require. The second is eudaimonia, the wellbeing that arises from being able to 
reflect on one’s values and live in accordance with them: this is what citizens require (Buchanan 2000). 
Buchanan argues that health promotion practitioners should exercise practical reason so as to facilitate 
the development, in citizens, of a disposition that is oriented towards achieving eudaimonia. Buchanan 
presents this as an alternative to what he argues is the contemporary malaise of health promotion: an 
instrumental, scientifically rational striving to improve physical health.  
Our work is in some senses compatible with Buchanan’s vision. Both presume plurality of values 
in communities, both emphasise that health promotion should provide a locus for community 
engagement, both value supporting communities to improve their lives in self-defined and self-sustaining 
ways, and both reject simple biomedical definitions of health.  Buchanan advocates that practitioners 
require practical reason: we argue that the account we provide here is evidence of such practical reason, 
being founded in practitioners’ experience, their understanding of the communities they work with, and 
their commitment to reflection on what the correct function of health promotion should be. The phronesis 
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in practitioners that Buchanan advocates would provide the necessary link in health promotion between 
appreciation of the teleological good and practice of the procedural good.  
 However there are important differences between our work and Buchanan’s. First, although 
these practitioners defined health very broadly (as not just physical, but social, emotional, environmental 
and situated), they were clear that they should be providing opportunities for health improvement, through 
primary prevention, with attention to procedural justice. This seems to us to be both more restricted and 
more justifiable than Buchanan’s extremely demanding eudaimonic purpose for health promotion. 
Second, although Buchanan’s analysis was richly informed by his experience and understanding of health 
promotion, his task was ambitious: to justify a completely new theoretical foundation for health promotion 
practice and ethics. In many ways, the resulting work is an ideal theory of health promotion. Our 
contribution, in contrast, is a practical theory, with a less ambitious goal – to describe a thick, vague 
notion of the good in health promotion. While we admire and agree with much of Buchanan’s reasoning, 
we believe that our contribution may provide more concrete and detailed criteria for evaluating both the 
substance and the process of health promotion.  
Our analysis is also relevant to the debate in health promotion ethics regarding paternalism and 
freedom. Recent work in public health ethics has emphasised that valuing positive freedoms can reduce 
concerns about paternalism – in fact, can potentially create obligations for states to provide health-
enhancing conditions for living (Wilson and Dawson 2010; Gostin and Gostin 2009).
5
 Capability 
arguments are one way of thinking about these obligations and their moral significance.  The goods 
described here are striking for their contrast with the paternalistic health promotion critiqued in the 
literature. Rather than being coercive, the health promotion valued here is respectful, responsive, tailored, 
capability-developing and relational, and seeks sustainable benefit in communities. We believe this thick, 
vague conception of the good in health promotion, founded in the values of practitioners themselves, 
makes an important contribution to the development of a more complete theory of health promotion 
ethics.   
 
Footnotes: 
1
 That is, an ethic which emphasises the importance of ends or purposes in determining what one ought 
to do: in Buchanan’s case, the purpose of health promotion is to facilitate the development of a 
particular kind of wellbeing in citizens.   
2
 That is, drawing on Aristotelian notions of wellbeing that emphasise the development of practical 
reason.  
3
 Nussbaum’s list has been subject to much debate since its publication, including over whether such a 
list can be developed at all, whether Nussbaum’s list has content validity, and whether Nussbaum’s list 
expresses a ‘human core’, as she intends it to do, or is instead a well-meaning form of cultural 
imperialism. It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into these extensive debates, or into the 
debates about the potential universalisability of empirical findings such as these. We suggest, 
however, that it is reasonable to propose that our findings might be theoretically generalisable. By this 
we mean that, given that these findings are based on rigorous analysis across diverse and informative 
practitioners and settings, the concepts produced are likely to also be relevant for health promotion in 
other settings (Mason 2007).
4 
In fact Buchanan makes considerable use of Nussbaum’s classical 
scholarship when discussing Aristotle. 
5 
The difference between positive and negative freedom has its origins  in the work of John Stuart Mill.
 
Negative freedom is the freedom not to be interfered with; positive freedom here refers to opportunity 
freedom – freedom to be or to do. Such positive freedom relies on the availability of conditions and 
opportunities that allow citizens to be and to do. For example, freedom to be healthy relies significantly 
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on the provision of basic sanitation, immunisation and health care, and such complex and collective 
tasks are unlikely to be provided – or at least, unlikely to be provided equitably – without some 
intervention by the state. There are clear resonances between positive freedom and capabilities.  
 
Acknowledgements: Our sincere thanks to the health promotion practitioners who participated in this 
project and the many colleagues whose support and advice has assisted in the project, particularly our 
Associate Investigators Louise Baur, Adrian Bauman, Avigdor Zask, Beverley Lloyd and Michelle Daley. 
This project is funded by the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC 632679). 
Dr Carter was supported by a University of Sydney Thompson Fellowship in 2011, and is supported by an 
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council Career Development Fellowship commencing 
2012 (NHMRC 1032963).  
 
REFERENCES 
Bayer, R., and Moreno, J. D. (1986). Health promotion: ethical and social dilemmas of government policy. 
Health Affairs 5 (2):72-85. 
Buchanan, D. R. (2000). An Ethic for Health Promotion: Rethinking the Sources of Human Well-Being. 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory : a practical guide through qualitative analysis. SAGE 
Publications, London. 
First International Conference on Health Promotion. (1986). Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, 
WHO/HPR/HEP/95.1. In. World Health Organization,  Ottawa. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed 
Again Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Frith, L. (2012). Symbiotic empirical ethics: a practical methodology. Bioethics 26 (4):198-206. 
Gostin, L. O., and Gostin, K. G. (2009). A broader liberty: JS Mill, paternalism and the public's health. 
Public Health 123 (3):214-21. 
Hammersley, M., and Atkinson, P. (2007). Ethnography: Principles in practice, 3rd ed. Taylor & Francis. 
Health Promotion Journal of Australia: Official Journal of Australian Association of Health Promotion 
Professionals. (1990ff). Australian Health Promotion Association, Melbourne, Victoria. 
Hunter, D., and Leveridge, J. (2011). The Concept of Community in Bioethics. Public Health Ethics 4 
(1):12-13. 
Jennings, B., Kahn, J., Mastroianni, A., and Parker, L. S. (2003). Ethics and Public Health: Model 
Curriculum. In. Health Resources and Services Administration, Association of Schools of Public 
Health and Hastings Centre,  Washington. 
Jones, M., and Bayer, R. (2007 ). Paternalism & Its Discontents: Motorcycle Helmet Laws, Libertarian 
Values, and Public Health. American Journal of Public Health 97:208-17. 
Mason, J. (2007). Qualitative Researching, 2nd ed. SAGE Publications, Los Angeles. 
Nilstun, T. (1994). Ethics and public health promotion. Epidemiologia e Prevenzione 18 (61):200-3. 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1990). Aristotelian Social Democracy. In Douglass, R. B., Mara, G. M., and 
Richardson, H. S. (eds), Liberalism and the good. New York, Routledge. pp. 203-52. 
15 | P a g e  
 
———. (1993). Non-relative virtues: an Aristotelian approach. In Sen, A., and Nussbaum, M. C. (eds), 
The quality of life. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
———. (1999). Sex & social justice. Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford. 
Robeyns, I. (2005). The Capability Approach: a theoretical survey. Journal of Human Development 6 
(1):93-117. 
Sen, A., and Nussbaum, M. C. (eds) (1993). The quality of life. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Sindall, C. (2002). Does health promotion need a code of ethics? Health Promotion International 17 
(3):201-03. 
Tannahill, A. (2008). Beyond evidence—to ethics: a decision-making framework for health promotion, 
public health and health improvement. Health Promotion International 23 (4):380-90. 
Views on health promotion online. (2008). Health promotion code of ethics. In. International Union for 
Health Promotion and Education,  Saint-Denis Cedex, France. 
Wilson, J., and Dawson, A. (2010). Giving Liberty Its Due, But No More: Trans Fats, Liberty, and Public 
Health. American Journal of Bioethics 10 (3):34-36. 
 
 
